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Abstract
In this paper we present a macroeconomic microfounded framework with heterogen-
eous agents – households, firms, banks – which interact through a decentralized matching
process presenting common features across four markets – goods, labor, credit and de-
posit. We study the dynamics of the model by means of computer simulation. Some
macroeconomic properties emerge such as endogenous business cycles, nominal GDP
growth, unemployment rate fluctuations, the Phillips curve, leverage cycles and credit
constraints, bank defaults and financial instability, and the importance of government
as an acyclical sector which stabilize the economy. The model highlights that even ex-
tended crises can endogenously emerge. In these cases, the system may remain trapped
in a large unemployment status, without the possibility to quickly recover unless an
exogenous intervention.
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1 Introduction
In recent years many economists have developed agent-based models to investigate the work-
ing of a macroeconomic system composed of heterogeneous interacting entities (Tesfatsion
and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). In general, the idea is start from simple
(adaptive) individual behavioral rules and interaction mechanisms in order to reproduce the
emergence of aggregate regularities and endogenous crises. In a sense, this is a generative
approach according to which we construct the macroeconomy from the “bottom up” (Epstein
and Axtell, 1996).
We report a few examples about agent-based models which analyze a decentralized match-
ing mechanism in one or more markets in order to reproduce some macroeconomic emergent
features. Fagiolo et al. (2004) investigate labor market dynamics and the evolution of ag-
gregate output. In particular, they model a decentralized matching process to describe the
interaction between workers and firms in context characterized by endogenous price forma-
tion and stochastic technical progress. Russo et al. (2007) present an agent-based model in
which bounded rational firms and workers interact on fully decentralized markets both for
final goods and labor. The model is used to analyze the role of fiscal policy in promoting R&D
investments that may increase economic growth. This model has been further developed by
Gaffeo et al. (2008) through the introduction of a similar matching protocol for the credit
market. Cincotti et al. (2010) investigate the interplay between monetary aggregates and
the dynamics of output and prices by considering both the credit extended by commercial
banks and the money supply created by the central bank. In particular, they study the ef-
fects of quantitative easing as a monetary policy. Building upon Dosi et al (2006, 2010),
Dosi et al. (2012) analyze the interplay between income distribution and economic policies.
They find that more unequal economies are exposed to more severe business cycles fluctu-
ations, higher unemployment rates, and higher probability of crises. They also find that fiscal
policies dampen business cycles, reduce unemployment and the likelihood of large crises, and
may affect positively long-term growth. Hence, agents-based macroeconomic models show
that an alternative formulation of microfoundations is possible for complex environment and
this has relevant implications for policy advice (Dawid and Neugart, 2011).
Our aim is to develop a macroeconomic framework with heterogeneous agents that in-
teract through a decentralized matching process presenting common features across markets.
The framework is basic since we propose a minimal macroeconomic model and it is flexible
because this baseline setup is thought to be enriched by adding new modules with different
agents, markets, and institutions. Indeed, in this paper we propose an agent-based macroe-
conomic model in which there are three classes of computational agents - households, firms,
banks - interacting in four markets - goods, labour, credit and deposit - according to a fully
decentralized matching mechanism. Moreover, we build a model in which stocks and flows are
mutually consistent. Stock-flow consistency is a very important feature (Godley and Lavoie,
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2006) that economists are applying also in the field of agent-based macroeconomics as, for
instance, in Cincotti et al. (2010, 2012), Kinsella et al. (2011), Seppecher (2012).
This paper is just a first step towards a complex task that is the development of a micro-
founded general (dis)equilibrium macroeconomic model based on heterogeneous interacting
agents. Although the model is populated by many heterogeneous agents which interact in a
truly decentralized way in different markets, various features of a macroeconomic framework
have still to be introduced, for instance technological progress, human capital, the foreign
sector, etc. Thus we focus on some characteristics such as the dynamics of financial variables
– firms’ leverage, banks’ exposure – and their interplay with the business cycle. Indeed, many
papers recently try to understand the leverage process both for firms and banks: Adrian
and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Flannery (1994), Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2008), Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008), He, Khang and Krish-
namurthy (2010), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011). Geanakoplos (2010) finds that leverage is
pro-cyclical, while Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011), as well as Adrian and Shin (2008,2009), find
that the leverage pattern for non-financial firms is acyclical (instead this is pro-cyclical for
investement banks and large commercial banks). The leverage level is a component of a more
general discussion on firm and bank capital structure, such as in Booth et al. (2001), Diamond
and Rajan (2000), Gropp and Heider (2010), Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), Rajan and
Zingales (1995). In the economic literature there are many theories on capital structure but
almost all previous papers in the agent-based macroeconomic approach assumed a “pecking
order” theory (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984), based on information asymmetry,
according to which investments are financed first with internally generated funds, then with
debt if internal funds are not enough, and equity is used as a last resort. A different perspect-
ive on the firms’ financial structure was proposed by the “trade-off” theory, firstly observed in
a paper concerning asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and in a work on underin-
vestment (Myers, 1977). This theory is based on the trade-off between the costs and benefits
of debt and implies that firms select a target debt-equity ratio. The empirical literature found
at first contrasting evidence to support these theories. Then, a refined version of the trade-off
theory was proposed: the “dynamic trade-off theory” (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). In this
theory firms actively pursue target debt ratios even though market frictions temper the speed
of adjustment. In other words, firms have long-run leverage targets, but they do not immedi-
ately reach them, instead they adjust to them during some periods. Dynamic trade-off seems
to be able to overcome some puzzles related to the other theories, explaining the stylized
facts emerged from the empirical analysis and numerous papers conclude that it dominates
alternative hypotheses: Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Mehotra, Mikkelsen, and
Partch (2003), Frank and Goyal (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006). Moreover, Graham
and Harvey (2001) conduct a survey where they evidence that 81% of firms affirm to consider
a target debt ratio or range when making their debt decisions.
Then, one of the major innovations we introduce compared to the agent-based macroeconomic
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framework delineated in the literature is that firms’ financial structure is derived from the
Dynamic Trade-Off theory. According to this theory, we assume that firms have a “target
leverage”, that is a desired ratio between debt and net worth, and they try to reach it by
following an adaptive rule governing credit demand. This capital structure is already invest-
igated in the agent-based model proposed by Riccetti et al. (2011) that builds upon the
previous work by Delli Gatti et al. (2010), which is based on a firms’ capital structure given
by the Pecking Order theory. The Dynamic Trade-Off theory has a relevant role in influencing
the leverage cycle, with important consequences on macroeconomic dynamics.
Another important point in the model is the presence of an acyclical sector, here repres-
ented by the government that hires public workers so providing a fraction of the aggregate
demand. In this way the government partially stabilizes the economy by reducing output
volatility. Nevertheless, our model also demonstrates that large and extended crises with
large unemployment and a lacking aggregate demand may endogenously emerge.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the basic aspects of the modeling
framework such as the sequence of events and the matching mechanism. Section 3 presents
the working of the four markets which composes our economy. The evolution of agents’ wealth
is described in Section 4, while the behavior of policy makers is discussed in Section 5. Model
dynamics are studied in Section 6 in which we report the simulation results. Moreover, in
Section 7 we develop some Monte Carlo experiments in order to: (i) investigate the relationship
between financial factors and the real economy, (ii) analyze the peculiar aspects of extended
crises. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model setup
The macroeconomy is populated by households (h = 1, 2, ..., H), firms (f = 1, 2, ..., F ), banks
(b = 1, 2, ..., B), a central bank, and the government, which interact over a time span t =
1, 2, ..., T in the following four markets:
• Credit market: firms and banks.
• Labor market: firms and households.
• Goods market: households and firms.
• Deposit market: banks and households.
Agents are boundedly rational and follow (relatively) simple rules of behaviour in an
incomplete and asymmetric information context: households try to buy consumption goods
from the cheapest supplier, they also try to work in the firm offering the highest wage; firms
try to accumulate profits by selling their products to households (they set the price according
to their individual excess demand) and hiring cheapest workers; workers update the asked
4
wage according to their occupational status (upward if employed, downward if unemployed);
households’ saving goes into bank deposits; given the Basilea-like regulatory constraints, banks
extend credit to finance firms’ production; firms choose the banks offering lowest interest
rates, while households deposit money in the banks offering the highest interest rates. The
government hires public workers, taxes private agents and issues public debt. Finally, the
central bank provides money to banks and the government given their requirements.
In the following subsections we firstly describe the sequence of events occurring in each
period. Subsequently, we explain the working of the matching mechanism which characterizes
the interaction structure of all markets.
2.1 Sequence of events
The sequence of events occurring in each period runs as follows:
1. At first firms ask for credit to banks given the demand deriving from their net worth
and leverage target. In each period, the leverage level changes according to expected
profits and inventories.
2. Banks set their credit supply depending on their net worth, deposits and the quantity of
money provided by the central bank. Moreover, they must comply with some regulatory
constraints.
3. Banks and firms interact in the credit market. At the end of the matching process,
some banks may lend all the available credit supply while others may remain with some
residual money; similarly, some firms may obtain the required credit while other may
remain credit constrained.
4. The government hires public workers. Moreover, it collects taxes (coming from previous
period private incomes and wealth) and, given the wage expenditure for public workers,
calculates its deficit (surplus), and updates the overall debt.
5. Banks buy government securities to employ excess liquidity. The central bank purchases
the remaining securities.
6. Firms hire workers in the labor market. The labor demand depends on available funds,
that is net worth and bank credit. After the labor matching some firms satisfy their
labor demand, while others remain with residual cash; at the same time, some people
may remain unemployed. Employed people pay income taxes to the government.
7. Firms produce consumption goods on the basis of hired workers. They put in the goods
market their current period production and previous period inventories.
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8. Households decide their desired consumption on the basis of their wages and wealth
(net of taxes).
9. Households and firms interact in the goods market. As a result, some households satisfy
their desired consumption, while others may remain with residual cash; on the other
hand, some firms sell all the produced output, while others may accumulate inventories.
10. Households determine their savings to be deposited in banks.
11. Firms calculate profits and survival firms repay their debt to banks, pay taxes, and
distribute dividends to households.
12. Banks calculate profits. Households lose (part of) deposited money in case of bank
defaults. Survival banks pay taxes and distribute dividends to households.
13. Agents update their wealth, on which they pay capital levy.
14. Central bank decides the amount of money to be lent to banks in the following period
according to credit demand/supply unbalance.
15. New entrants replace bankrupted agents (firms or banks with negative net worth) ac-
cording to a one-to-one replacement. New agents enter the system with initial conditions
we will define below. Moreover, the money needed to finance entrants is subtract from
households’ wealth. In the case private wealth is not enough, then government inter-
venes.
2.2 The matching mechanism
In each of the four markets composing our macroeconomy the following matching protocol
is at work. In general, two classes of agents interact, that is the demand and the supply
sides. One side observes a list of potential counterparts and chooses the most suitable partner
according to some market-specific criteria.
At the beginning, a random list of agents in the demand side – firms in the credit market,
firms in the labor market, households in the goods market, and banks in the deposit market –
is set. Then, the first agent in the list observes a random subset of potential partners, whose
size depends on a parameter 0 < χ ≤ 1 (which proxies the degree of imperfect information),
and chooses the cheapest one. For example, in the labor market, the first firm on the list, say
the firm f1 observes the asked wage of a subsample of workers and chooses the agent asking
for the lowest one, say the worker h1.
After that, the second agent on the list performs the same activity on a new random subset of
the updated potential partner list. In the case of the labor market, the new list of potential
workers to be hired no longer contains the worker h1. The process iterates till the end of
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the demand side list (in our example, all the firms enter the matching process and have the
possibility to employ one worker).
Then, a new random list of agents in the demand side is set and the whole matching mechanism
goes on until either one side of the market (demand or supply) is empty or no further matchings
are feasible because the highest bid (for example, the money till available to the richest firm)
is lower than the lowest ask (for example, the lowest wage asked by till unemployed workers).
Given this matching protocol governing agents’ interaction, now we describe the details
of agents’ behavior in the four markets.
3 Markets
3.1 Credit market
Firms and banks interact in this market: firms want to finance production and banks may
provide credit to this end. Firm’s f credit demand at time t depends on its net worth Aft
and the leverage target lft. Hence, required credit is:
Bdft = Aft · lft (1)
The leverage target is set according to the following rule:
lft =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
lft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) > ift−1 and yˆft−1 < ψ · yft−1
lft−1, if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) = ift−1 and yˆft−1 < ψ · yft−1
lft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) < ift−1 or yˆft−1 ≥ ψ · yft−1
(2)
where α > 0 is a parameter representing the maximum percentage change of the relevant
variable (in this case the target leverage), U(0, 1) is a random number picked from a uniform
distribution in the interval (0,1), pift−1 is the gross profit (realized in the previous period),
Bft−1 is the previous period effective debt, ift−1 is the nominal interest rate paid on previ-
ous debts1, yˆft−1 represents inventories (that is, unsold goods), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 is a parameter
representing a threshold for inventories based on previous period production yft−1.
On the other side, bank b offers a total amount of money Bdbt depending on net worth Abt,
deposits Dbt, central bank credit mbt, and some legal constraints (proxied by the parameters
γ1 > 0 and 0 ≤ γ2 ≤ 1 that represents respectively the maximum admissible leverage and
maximum percentage of capital to be invested in lending activities):
Bdbt = min(kˆbt, k¯bt) (3)
1It is a mean interest rate calculated as the weighted average of interests paid to the lending banks
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where kˆ = γ1·Abt, k¯ = γ2·Abt+Dbt−1+mbt. Moreover, in order to reduce risk concentration,
banks lend to a single firm up to a maximum fraction β of the total amount of the credit
Bdbt. This behavioural parameter can be also interpreted as a regulatory constraint to avoid
excessive concentration.
The interest rate charged by the bank b on the firm f at time t is given by:
ibft = iCBt + iˆbt + i¯ft (4)
where iCBt is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank at time t, iˆbt is a bank-
specific component, and i¯ft = ρ
lft/100 is a firm-specific component, that is a risk premium
on firm target leverage.
The bank-specific component evolves as follows:
iˆbt =
8
<
:
iˆbt · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Bˆbt−1 > 0
iˆbt · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Bˆbt−1 = 0
(5)
where Bˆbt−1 is the amount of money that the bank did not manage to lend to firms in the
previous period.
Given this setting on credit supply and demand, firms and banks interact according to the
matching mechanism. As a consequence, each firm ends up with a credit Bft ≤ B
d
ft and each
bank lends to firms an amount Bbt ≤ B
d
bt. The difference between desired and effective credit
is equal to Bdft−Bft = Bˆft and B
d
bt−Bbt = Bˆbt, for firms and banks respectively. Moreover, we
hypothesize that banks ask for an investment in government securities equal to Γdbt = k¯bt−Bbt.
If the sum of desired government bonds exceeds the amount of outstanding public debt then
the effective investment Γbt is rescaled according to a factor Γ
d
bt/
P
Γdbt. Instead, if public debt
exceeds the banks’ desired amount, then the central bank buys the difference.
3.2 Labor market
In each period, the government hires a fraction g of households. The remaining part is
available for working in the firms. Firm’s f labor demand depends on the total capital
available: Aft + Bft. Each worker posts a wage wht which is updated according to the
following rule:
wht =
8
<
:
wht−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if h employed at time t− 1
wht−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if h unemployed at time t− 1
(6)
However, the required wage has a minimum related to the price of a single good net of
income tax.
Given this setting on labor supply and demand, firms and households interact according
to the matching mechanism. As a consequence, each firm ends up with a number of workers
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nft and a residual cash (insufficient to hire an additional worker). Obviously, a fraction of
households may remain unemployed. For the sake of simplicity, the wage of unemployed
people is set equal to zero.
3.3 Goods market
In this market households represent the demand side, while firms are the supply side. House-
holds set the desired consumption as follows:
cdht = c1 · wht + c2 · Aht (7)
where 0 < c1 ≤ 1 is the propensity to consume current income, 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1 is the propensity
to consume the wealth Aht. If the amount c
d
ht is smaller than the average price of one good p¯
then cdht = min(p¯ , wht + Aht). By summing up the individual consumption of households we
obtain the aggregate demand. It is worth noticing that current income derives from both a
cyclical private industrial sector and an acyclical public service sector.
Firm f produces an amount of goods given by:
yft = φ · nft (8)
where φ ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter.
The firm tries to sell this produced amount plus the inventories yˆft−1. The selling price
evolves according to this rule:
pft =
8
<
:
pft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft−1 = 0 and yft−1 > 0
pft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft−1 > 0 or yft−1 = 0
(9)
However, the minimum price is set such that it is at least equal to the average cost of
production.
Given this setting on goods supply and demand, households and firms interact according
to the matching mechanism. As a consequence, each household ends up with a residual cash,
that is not enough to buy an additional good and that she will try to deposit in a bank. On
the other hand, firms sell an amount 0 ≤ y¯ft ≤ yft and they may remain with unsold goods
(that is, the inventories yˆft = yft − y¯ft that the firm will try to sell in the next period).
3.4 Deposit market
In the deposit market, banks represent the demand side (because they require capital to
extend credit) and households are on the supply side. Banks offer an interest rate on deposits
according to their funds requirement:
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iDbt =
8
<
:
iDbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if k¯bt −Bbt − Γbt > 0
min{iDbt−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , iCBt}, if k¯bt −Bbt − Γbt = 0
(10)
where Γbt is the amount of public debt bought by bank b at time t. Hence, the previous
equation states that if a bank exhausts the credit supply by lending to private firms or
government then it decides to increase the interest rate paid on deposits, so to attract new
depositors, and viceversa. However, the interest rate on deposits can increase till a maximum
given by the policy rate rCBt which is both the rate at which banks could refinance from the
central bank and the rate paid by the government on public bonds.
Households set the minimum interest rate they want to obtain on bank deposits as follows:
iDht =
8
<
:
iDht−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Dht−1 = 0
iDht−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Dht−1 > 0
(11)
where Dht−1 is the household h’s deposit in the previous period. This means that a
household that found a bank paying an interest rate higher or equal to the desired one
decides to ask for a higher remuneration. In the opposite case, she did not find a bank
satisfying her requirements, thus she kept her money in cash and now she asks for a lower
rate. We hypothesize that a household deposits all the available money in a single bank that
offers an adequate interest rate. A household that decides to not deposit her money in a
bank signals a preference for liquidity, because she does not accept to deposit her cash for an
interest rate below the desired one.
4 Wealth evolution
4.1 Firms
According to the outcomes of the credit, labor and goods markets, the firm f ’s profit is equal
to:
pift = pft · y¯ft −Wft − Ift (12)
where Wft is the firm f ’s wage bill, that is the sum of wages paid to employed workers,
and Ift is the sum of interests paid on bank loans.
Firms pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; negative profits will be subtracted from
the next positive profits. We indicate net profits with p¯ift.
Finally, firms pay a percentage δft as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤ δft ≤
1 evolves according to the following rule:
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δft =
8
<
:
δft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft = 0 and yft > 0
δft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft > 0 or yft = 0
(13)
We indicate the profit net of taxes and dividends as pˆift. Obviously, in case of negative
profits pˆift = pift.
Thus, the firm f ’s net worth evolves as follows:
Aft = (1− τ
′) · [Aft−1 + pˆift] (14)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If Aft ≤ 0 then the firm goes bankrupt and a new entrant takes its place. The initial
net worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average goods price, while the leverage is
one. Moreover, the initial price is equal to the mean price of survival firms. Banks linked
to defaulted firms lose a fraction of their loans (the loss given default rate is calculated as
(Aft +Bft)/Bft).
4.2 Banks
As a consequence of operations in the credit and the deposit markets, the bank b’s profit is
equal to:
pibt = intbt + i
Γ
t · Γbt − i
D
bt−1 ·Dbt−1 − iCB
t ·mbt − badbt (15)
where intbt represents the interests gained on lending to non-defaulted firms, i
Γ
t is the
interest rate on government securities (Γbt), and badbt is the amount of “bad debt” due to
bankrupted firms, that is non performing loans. Bad debt is the loss given default of the total
loan, that is a fraction 1 − (Aft + Bft)/Bft of the loan to defaulted firm f connected with
bank b.
Banks pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; negative profits will be subtracted from
the next positive profits. We indicate net profits with p¯ibt.
Finally, banks pay a percentage δbt as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤
δbt ≤ 1 evolves according to the following rule:
δbt =
8
<
:
δbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Bbt > 0 and Bˆbt = 0
δft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Bbt = 0 or Bˆbt > 0
(16)
Indeed, if the bank does not manage to lend the desired supply of credit then it decides to
distribute more dividends (because it does not need high reinvested profits), and viceversa.
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We indicate the profit net of taxes and dividends as pˆibt. Obviously, in case of negative
profits pˆibt = pibt.
Thus, the bank b’s net worth evolves as follows:
Abt = (1− τ
′) · [Abt−1 + pˆibt] (17)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If Abt ≤ 0 then the bank is in default and a new entrant takes its place. Households linked
to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits (the loss given default rate is calculated as
(Abt +Dbt)/Dbt). The initial net worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average goods
price. Moreover, the initial bank-specific component of the interest rate (ˆibt) is equal to the
mean value across banks.
4.3 Households
According to the outcomes of the labor, goods, and deposit markets, the household h’s wealth
evolves as follows:
Aht = (1− τ
′) · [(Aht−1 + (1− τ) · wht + divht + int
D
ht − cht] (18)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
that is a multiple of the average goods price), τ is the tax rate on income, wht is the wage
gained by employed workers, divht is the fraction (proportional to the household h’s wealth
compared to overall households’ wealth) of dividends distributed by firms and banks net of
the amount of resources needed to finance new entrants (hence, this value may be negative),
intDht represents interests on deposits, and cht ≤ c
d
ht is the effective consumption. Households
linked to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits as already explained above.
5 Government and central bank
On the one hand, the government’s current expenditure is given by the sum of wages paid to
public workers (Gt), the interests paid on public debt to banks, and an amount Ωt which is
normally zero but for extreme cases in which the government has to intervene to finance new
entrants when private wealth is not enough. On the other hand, government collects taxes
on incomes and wealth, and receives interests gained by the central bank. The difference
between expenditures and revenues is the public deficit Ψt. Consequently, public debt is
Γt = Γt−1 +Ψt.
Central bank decides the policy rate iCBt and put a quantity of money into the system
in accordance with it. In order to do that, the central bank observes the aggregate excess
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Table 1: Parameter setting
H number of households 500
F number of firms 80
B number of banks 10
α adjustment parameter 0.05
χ matching imperfect information 0.2
ψ inventory threshold 0.1
γ1 max bank’s leverage 10
γ2 max % of bank’s invested capital in lending 0.5
β max bank’s lending to single firm 0.5
ρ risk premium on firm’s loan 2
c1 propensity to consume current income 0.8
c2 propensity to consume wealth 0.3
φ firm’s productivity 3
τ tax rate on income 0.3
τ ′ tax rate on wealth 0.05
τ¯ ′ threshold for tax on wealth 3
g % of public workers on population 0.33
supply or demand in the credit market and sets an amount of money Mt to reduce the gap
in the following period.
6 Simulations
We run a baseline simulation for a time span of T =150 periods and analyse the results for the
last 50 (so the first 100 are used to initialise the model). Table 1 shows the parameter setting of
the baseline simulation. The initial agents’ wealth is set as follows: Af1 = max{0.1, N(3, 1)},
Ab1 = max{0.2, N(5, 1)}, Ah1 = max{0.01, N(0.5, 0.01)}. The policy rate iCBt is constant at
1%.
Simulation results are displayed in Figure 1 and show that endogenous business cycles
emerge as a consequence of the interaction between real and financial factors. When firms’
profits are improving, they try to expand the production and, if banks extend the required
credit, this results in more employment; the decrease of the unemployment rate leads to the
rise of wages that, on the one hand, increases the aggregate demand, while on the other
hand reduces firms’ profits, and this may cause the inversion of the business cycle. This
feature of the business cycle is described in Figure 2 where we show the cross-correlation
between the unemploymet rate and the firms’ profit rate.2 First of all, there is a high positive
2In order to obtain a more statistical significant result we extended the simulation period to T=500.
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correlation at lag 0: the profit rate is high when unemployment is high given that firms
save on production costs (e.g., wage bill) but, at the same time, the aggregate demand does
not decrease proportionally, because of public workers’ expenditure and consumption due to
wealth, thus firms can sell their commodities (including inventories) in the goods market.
However, the presence of unemployed people, the tendency of wages to decrease due to the
high unemployment rate, and the reduction of households’ wealth, cause the fall of next period
aggregate demand that, in turn, reduces firms’ profits. Indeed, Figure 2 displays a negative
correlation at lag +1. Instead, the negative correlation at lag -1 means that increasing profits
boost the expansion of the economy and then a fall of the unemployment rate follows. The two
major innovations we introduce in this agent-based framework, that is (i) the Dynamic Trade-
Off theory for firms’ capital structure and its interplay with banks’ credit supply, (ii) the role of
an acyclical sector, have opposite effects on business fluctuations. On one hand, firms’ leverage
and, in particular, banks’ exposure enlarge business fluctuations: a growing firm requires more
credit and, if banks extended new loans, then they are able to expand the production through
the employment of more workers; after a while, the rise of employment fosters wages that,
together with the rise of interest payments on an increasing debt, reduces firms’ profitability.
Thus the business cycle reverses and financial factors amplify the fall of production (the
relatively low level of profits with respect to interest payments induces a deleveraging process).
In other words, credit is pro-cyclical. In particular, there is a negative but modest correlation
between firms’ leverage and the unemployment rate (-0.1539), while there is a more significant
negative correlation between banks’ exposure and unemployment (-0.3670). This simulation
result is consistent with the empirical evidence on the topic (see, for instance, Kalemli-Ozcan
et al., 2011). Accordingly, banks’ capitalization plays a relevant role in determining credit
conditions, so influencing firms’ leverage and, in general, the macroeconomic evolution. On
the other hand, the presence of an acyclical sector, here represented by the government, has
a fundamental role in sustaining the aggregate demand and in mitigating output volatility.
The nominal GDP grows along time as a consequence of price inflation (given that there
is no productivity growth in the baseline model). The average inflation rate is 2.07% with
a minimum of 1.12% and a maximum of 2.87%. The unemployment rate oscillates around
8.42% with a minimum of 4% and a maximum of 12.8%. Model simulation reproduces a
Phillips curve, that is a negative relationship between wage inflation and unemployment rate
(the correlation coefficient is -0.76). The average fraction of firms going bankrupt is 6.3%,
with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 25%. The average fraction of bank defaults is
1.2%, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 10%. Bank’s leverage is inversely related
to bank’s net worth. The per-capita average banks’ net worth (in real terms) is 8.91 (min
7.30, max 11.23). Moreover, credit mismatch (that is the difference between banks’ credit
supply and firms’ credit demand) tends to follow the cycle of banks’ net worth: when banks
are poorly capitalised this results in credit rationing for firms; in this case, the central bank
intervenes providing credit to banks; on the contrary, when banks are well capitalised they
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Figure 2: Unemployment rate and firms’ profit rate.
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are able to fulfill all credit demand. Accordingly, firms’ mean leverage is influenced by credit
availability. The mean interest rate charged by banks on firm loans is 8.11%. Per-capita
households wealth (in real terms) is stable around 2.06 (min 2.01, max 2.10), while the same
value for firms is equal to 3.91 (min 3.54, max 4.31). Finally, the average ratio between public
deficit and GDP is equal to 3.09% (min 2.16%, max 4.22%). It is worth to note that the
presence of the government, nevertheless the relatively low level of public deficit, allows for
the nominal growth in the model. This outcome also depends on the working of the central
bank that finances the government buying public securities charging a low interest rate.
7 Monte Carlo analysis
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we performed 1000 Monte Carlo simulations
of the baseline model. The first result of this computational experiment is that in some
replications the economy completely crashes and the unemployment rate reaches very large
values. To identify the worst case scenarios we set a threshold for the average unemployment
rate equal to 20%. Then, we discard the five simulations with an average unemployment rate
(computed over the time span 101-150) above the threshold. The statistics of the Monte Carlo
experiment on the remaining 995 simulations are reported in Table 2. The results describe
the average macroeconomic behaviour of the system, showing that mean variables values are
quite stable across repeated simulations. The only two variables which are more unstable
16
across simulations are: the credit constraint (that is, the fraction of firms’ required credit not
fulfilled by banks), and the bank exposure (calculated as the amount of credit lent to firms
divided by net worth). The latter variable has a relevant procyclical impact on the economy,
that is there is a significant negative correlation between bank exposure and unemployment.
In particular, the mean value across simulations is equal to -50.09% (with a standard deviation
of 16.03%).
Table 2: Monte Carlo replications: mean values and corresponding standard deviation (calcu-
lated over the time span 101-150) of 995 simulations with average unemployment rate below
20%.
Variable Mean St. Dev.
Unemployment rate 9.92% 1.63%
Unemployment volatility 2.05% 0.48%
Firm default rate 6.45% 2.10%
Bank default rate 0.57% 0.57%
Wage share 63.4% 0.53%
Public deficit 3.26% 0.19%
Interest rate 9.11% 1.93%
Inflation rate 1.99% 0.07%
Credit constraint 14.83% 8.23%
Firm mean leverage 1.65 0.24
Bank mean exposure 3.27 1.30
Firm leverage volatility 0.12 0.04
Bank exposure volatility 0.51 0.33
7.1 Financial factors and the real economy
Now we analyse in more detail the relationship between financial variables, like firm leverage
and bank exposure, and the unemployment rate (which represents the main real variable in
our macroeconomic framework).
Figure 3 shows that there is a negative non-linear relation between firm leverage and unem-
ployment. It is worth to note that for relatively high levels of firm leverage the unemployment
rate tends to be smaller and less volatile. However, for largest values of the firm leverage
(above 2) the negative relation with the unemployment rate tends to disappear or rather it
reverses (as shown by the cubic fit in the Figure).
Figure 4 shows that a non-linear relation between bank exposure and unemployment emerges.
In particular, for low levels, an increase of bank exposure reduces the rate of unemployment.
Instead, for high levels of bank exposure (that is, above 5) a further increase makes the un-
employment higher. In other words, if banks increase their exposure enlarging credit to firms,
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Figure 3: Firm leverage and unemployment rate.
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Figure 4: Bank exposure and unemployment rate.
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the latter hire more workers and the unemployment rate decreses. But, when the exposure
of banks becomes “excessive” this leads to instability (more failures) and an increase of the
unemployment rate follows.
7.2 Large crises
In the previous Monte Carlo experiment we observe 5 out of 1000 cases characterised by a
large mean unemployment rate (during the period from t = 101 to t = 150). This means
that large crises can appear in the macroeconomic system. Moreover, in some simulations we
note that the time series of the main macroeconomic variables are non-stationary. In order to
check the presence of endogenous regime switches, e.g. from a “normal” period (with average
values of variables close to those in Table 2) to a large and extended crisis, we perform an
additional Monte Carlo experiment with 100 simulations over a time span of 500 periods (for
the same reasons explained above, we discard the first 100 periods of each simulation).
In 2 out of 100 simulations the macroeconomic system evolves towards an “extended crisis”
scenario, where the private sector tends to disappear, with an unemployment rate above
60%, thus almost only public workers remain employed. In this case, as shown in Figure 5,
differently from the usual business cycle mechanism, the decrease of wages due to growing
unemployment does not reverse the cycle, but rather amplifies the recession due to the lack
of aggregate demand. In other words, the self-adjustment mechanism which spontaneously
reverses the business cycle (e.g., the rise of the unemployment rate reduces the real wage
and then the resulting increase of profits makes room for an expansionary production phase)
does not work. Indeed, real wage lowers excessively boosting a vicious circle for which the
fall of purchasing power prevents firms to sell commodities, then firms reduce production,
unemployment continues to rise, and the system moves towards a devastating crisis.
In particular, in one of the two extended crises detected in the Monte Carlo experiment,
the production system completely crashes and cannot escape this trap without an exogenous
intervention. Instead, in the case explained above, the production system does not completely
disrupt, then we cannot exclude a recovery in the very long run. But, accordingly to Keynes,
“in the long run we are all dead”.
8 Concluding remarks and future research
We present an agent-based macroeconomic model in which heterogeneous agents (households,
firms and banks) interact according to a fully decentralized matching mechanism. The match-
ing protocol is common to all markets (goods, labor, credit, deposits) and represents a best
partner choice in a context of imperfect information.
Model simulation shows that decentralized interactions among heterogeneous entities give
rise to emergent macroeconomic properties like the growth of nominal GDP, the fluctuation
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Figure 5: The extended crisis case: unemployment rate and real wage.
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of the unemployment rate, the presence of the Phillips curve, the relevance of leverage cycles
and credit constraints on economic performance, the presence of bank defaults and the role of
financial instability, and the importance of government in providing a fraction of the aggregate
demand and then as an acyclical sector which stabilize the economy. In particular, simulations
show that endogenous business cycles emerge as a consequence of the interaction between real
and financial factors: when firms’ profits are improving, they try to expand the production
and, if banks extend the required credit, this results in more employment; the decrease of the
unemployment rate leads to the rise of wages that, on the one hand, increases the aggregate
demand, while on the other hand reduces firms’ profits, and this may cause the inversion of
the business cycle.
Monte Carlo simulations show that model findings are quite robust. A particularly rel-
evant result is that a non-linear relation between firm leverage and unemployment emerges:
for relatively high levels of firm leverage the unemployment rate tends to be smaller and less
volatile. However, for largest values of the firm leverage the negative relation with the un-
employment rate tends to reverse. Also bank exposure and unemployment are non-lineraly
related: for low levels, an increase of bank exposure reduces the rate of unemployment; in-
stead, for high levels of bank exposure a further increase makes the unemployment higher. In
other words, if banks increase their exposure enlarging credit to firms, the latter hire more
workers and the unemployment rate decreses. But, when the exposure of banks becomes
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“excessive” this leads to instability (more failures) and an increase of the unemployment rate
follows. All in all, firm leverage and bank exposure may support the working of the economy
(reducing the unemployment rate), but when the levels of both leverage or exposure turn to
be excessive, the economy becomes too financially fragile (and unemployment may rise).
Moreover, model simulations highlight that even extended crises can endogenously emerge
with a strong reduction of real wages, a consequent fall of the aggregate demand that, in
turn, induces firms to decrease production, so enlarging the unemployment rate, in a vicious
positive feedback circle. In these cases, the system may remain trapped in a situation, without
the possibility to spontaneously recover unless an exogenous intervention.
Our modeling framework can be useful to understand the effects of some policy or institu-
tional changes. Indeed, in future developments we will analyse the sensitivity of simulations
results to different parameter settings. Moreover, we will also investigate the consequences
of alternative assumptions such as the effect of fiscal and monetary policies, labor market
rigidity, heterogeneous consumption behavior, etc. Finally, the baseline model presented in
this paper will be enriched by adding modules as the interbank market, the stock and bond
markets (allowing agents to decide their portfolio allocation), and long-run growth factors
(heterogeneous workers’ skills, R&D investments, etc.).
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